Construing the statute's text, we hold that an owner-occupied residence not used for any commercial purpose does not qualify as property "used in" commerce or. Written and … The defend-. Ibid. Courts of Appeals have divided both on the question whether § 844(i) applies to buildings not used for commercial purposes,2 and on the constitutionality of such an application.3 We granted certiorari, 528 U. S. 1002 (1999), and framed as the question presented: "Whether, in light of United States v. Lopez, 514 U. S. 549 (1995), and the interpretive rule that constitutionally doubtful constructions should be avoided, see Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Building & Constr. Courts of Appeals have divided both on the question whether §844(i) applies to buildings not used for commercial purposes,2 and on the constitutionality of such an application.3 We granted certiorari, 528 U. S. 1002 (1999), and framed as the question presented: "Whether, in light of United States v. Lopez, 514 U. S. 549 (1995), and the interpretive rule that constitutionally doubtful constructions should be avoided, see Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Building & Constr. Id., at 861, and n. 8 (citing H. R. Rep. No. Ibid.8 Here, as earlier emphasized, the owner used the property as his home, the center of his family life. (b) The foregoing reading is in harmony with the guiding principle that where a statute is susceptible of two constructions, by one of which grave and doubtful constitutional questions arise and by the other of which such questions are avoided, the Court's duty is to adopt the latter. Code §§35-43-1-1, 35-50-2-5 (1993), illustrates how a criminal law like this may effectively displace a policy choice made by the State. It unavoidably follows that any fact necessary to prevent a sentence from being substantively unreasonable—thereby Jones unsuccessfully urged, both before the District Court and on appeal to the Seventh Circuit, that § 844(i), when applied to the arson of a private residence, exceeds the authority vested in Congress under the Commerce Clause of the. The House Report accompanying the final bill, we further noted in Russell, described §844(i) as "a very broad provision covering substantially all business property." Id., at 862. Firefox, or Moreover, to the extent that the word "property" is ambiguous as placed in § 1341, we have instructed that "ambiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity." PETITIONER:Jones RESPONDENT:United StatesLOCATION:Wolverine Tube, Inc. DOCKET NO. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES . H. R. Rep. No. A federal grand jury returned a three-count indictment charging Jones with arson, 18 U. S. C. §844(i) (1994 ed., Supp. Holding that the Act exceeded Congress' power to regulate commerce, the Court stressed that the area was one of traditional state concern, see 514 U. S., at 561, n. 3, 567; id., at 577 (KENNEDY, J., concurring), and that the legislation aimed at activity in which "neither the actors nor their conduct has a commercial character," id., at 580 (KENNEDY, J., concurring); id., at 560562 (opinion of the Court). United States ex rel. THOMAS, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which SCALIA, J., joined, post, p.860. Practically every building in our cities, towns, and rural areas is constructed with supplies that have moved in interstate commerce, served by utilities that have an interstate connection, financed or insured by enterprises that do business across state lines, or bears some other trace of interstate commerce. Synopsis of … "), with Russell, 471 U. S., at 862 (focusing instead on fact that "[t]he rental of real estate is unquestionably ... an activity" affecting commerce). United States, 410 F.2d 1209 (10th Cir. Jones v. United States. IV), as there construed, is constitutional in its application to all buildings used for commercial activities. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Jones's contention that §844(i), when applied to the arson of a private residence, exceeds the authority vested in Congress under the Commerce Clause. He earned rental income from the property and "treated it as business property for tax purposes." We have instructed that "ambiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity," Rewis v. United States, 401 U. S. 808, 812 (1971), and that "when choice has to be made between two readings of what conduct Congress has made a crime, it is appropriate, before we choose the harsher alternative, to require that Congress should have spoken in language that is clear and definite," United States v. Universal C. I. T. Credit Corp., 344 U. S. 218, 221-222 (1952). The panel majority considered adequate either of two interstate commerce connections: the building was owned and leased by out-of-state parties, and received natural gas from across state borders. The ensuing fire severely damaged the home. 3-10. See Ferrara v. United States, 384 F. Supp. To read § 844(i) as encompassing the arson of an owneroccupied private home would effect such a change, for arson is a paradigmatic common-law state crime. See Brief for United States 19-23. Get United States v. Jones, 132 S.Ct. Given the concerns brought to the fore in Lopez, it is appropriate to avoid the constitutional question that would arise were the Court to read §844(i) to render the traditionally local criminal conduct in which Jones engaged a matter for federal enforcement. Internet Explorer 11 is no longer supported. For this reason, I reiterate my firm belief that we should interpret narrowly federal criminal laws that overlap with state authority unless congressional intention to assert its jurisdiction is plain. commerce." Bond v United States, 529 U.S. 334 (2000), was a United States Supreme Court Fourth Amendment case that applied the ruling of Minnesota v. Dickerson to luggage, which held that police may not physically manipulate items without a … [Cite as State v. Jones (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 430.] The Court there observed that "[b]y its terms," §844(i) applies only to "property that is `used' in an `activity' that affects commerce," and ruled that "the rental of real estate" fits that description, ibid. id., at 145. United States Court of Appeals, We hold that the provision covers only property currently used in commerce or in an activity affecting commerce. Bass, 404 U. S., at 349. Defendant Jones was found guilty of involuntary manslaughter of his friend’s 10-month-old baby where he failed to provide for the child and such failure resulted in the child’s death. denied, 514 U. S. 1082 (1995). We noted in Russell that the original version of the bill that became §844(i) applied to destruction, by means of explosives, of property used "for business purposes." Id., at 862. The Government does not allege that the residence here served as a home office or the locus of any commercial undertaking. The home's only "active employment," so far as the record reveals, was for the everyday living of Jones's cousin and his family. Russell, 471 U. S., at 860, n. 5. "Congress did not define the crime described in § 844(i) as the explosion of a building whose damage or destruction might affect interstate commerce .... " United States v. Mennuti, 639 F.2d 107, 110 (CA2 1981) (Friendly, J. Were the Court to adopt the Government's expansive interpretation, hardly a building in the land would fall outside § 844(i)'s domain, and the statute's limiting language, "used in," would have no office. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT. 99-5739. It also seems appropriate, however, to emphasize the kinship between our well-established presumption against federal pre-emption of state law, see Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U. S. 151, 157 (1978), and our reluctance to "believe Congress intended to authorize federal intervention in local law enforcement in a marginal case such as this." IV), as there construed, is constitutional in its application to all buildings used for commercial activities. Walker's home was severely damaged. The ensuing fire severely damaged the home. Jones appealed, and the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the judgment of the District Court. But § 844(i) contains the qualifying words "used in" a commerce-affecting activity. Justia Annotations is a forum for attorneys to summarize, comment on, and analyze case law published on our site. One was the residence of the owner and her family, the other was a rental property. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Before both courts that the Jones v. the United States, 529 U.S. 848 (2000) case was presented, Jones ended up unsuccessfully arguing that in a scenario whereby section 844 (i) ended up being applied to private residence arson it could exceed the congress vested authority with subject to the commerce clause of the United States constitution. Syllabus. ", We previously construed §844(i) in Russell v. United States, 471 U. S. 858 (1985), and there held that §844(i) applies to a building "used as rental property," ibid. Construing the statute's text, we hold that an owner-occupied residence not used for any commercial purpose does not qualify as property "used in" commerce or commerce-affecting activity; arson of such a dwelling, therefore, is not subject to federal prosecution under §844(i). United States v. Ryan, 9 F. 3d 660, 675 (CA8 1993) (Arnold, C. J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).7. In a unanimous opinion, delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that an owner-occupied residence not used for any commercial purpose does not qualify as property "used in" commerce or commerce-affecting activity, such that arson of such a dwelling is not subject to federal prosecution under section 844(i). (b) The foregoing reading is in harmony with the guiding principle that where a statute is susceptible of two constructions, by one of which grave and doubtful constitutional questions arise and by the other of which such questions are avoided, the Court's duty is to adopt the latter. Even when Congress has undoubted power to pre-empt local law, we have wisely decided that "unless Congress conveys its purpose clearly, it will not be deemed to have significantly changed the federal-state balance." LEXIS 9885, 49 A.L.R. Judges should hesitate to treat statutory terms in any setting as surplusage, particularly when the words describe an element of a crime. IV) reads in relevant … Copyright © 2021, Thomson Reuters. The key word is "used." Our holding that §844(i) does not cover the arson of an owner-occupied dwelling means that Jones's §844(i) conviction must be vacated. Ambiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity, Rewis v. United States, 401 U. S. 808, 812, and when choice must be made between two readings of what conduct Congress has made a crime, it is appropriate, before choosing the harsher alternative, to require that Congress should have spoken in language that is clear and definite, United States v. Universal C. I. T. Credit Corp., 344 U. S. 218, 221-222. Is such a dwelling place, in the words of § 844(i), "used in ... any activity affecting ... commerce"? Our holding that § 844(i) does not cover the arson of an owner-occupied dwelling means that Jones's § 844(i) conviction must be vacated. First, the homeowner "used" the dwelling as collateral to obtain and secure a mortgage from an Oklahoma lender; the lender, in turn, "used" the property as security for the home loan. In holding that a statute making it a federal crime to possess a firearm within 1,000 feet of a school exceeded Congress' power to regulate commerce, this Court, in United States v. Lopez, 514 U. S. 549, stressed that the area was one of traditional state concern, see, e. g., id., at 561, n. 3, and that the legislation aimed at activity in which neither the actors nor their conduct had a commercial character, e. g., id., at 560-562. It is a federal crime under 18 U. S. C. §844(i) (1994 ed., Supp. United States v. Bass, 404 U. S. 336, 350 (1971). L. 97-298, § 2(c), 96 Stat. 678, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (1982). Brief Fact Summary. The email address cannot be subscribed. Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court. Subsequently, Jones was convicted in U.S. District Court of violating 18 U.S.C. THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. JONES, APPELLEE. Our decision in Russell does not warrant a less "use" -centered reading of § 844(i). what conduct Congress has made a crime, it is appropriate, before choosing the harsher alternative, to require that Congress should have spoken in language that is clear and definite, United States v. Universal C. I. T. Credit Corp., 344 U. S. 218, 221-222. V), which made it a federal crime to possess a firearm within. See infra, at 3. Jones appealed, and the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the judgment of the District Court. United States v. Mennuti, 639 F. 2d 107, 110 (CA2 1981) (Friendly, J. Bailey v. United States, 516 U. S. 137, 143, 145 (1995); see also Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U. S. 179, 187 (1995) ("When terms used in a statute are undefined, we give them their ordinary meaning."). The House Report accompanying the 1982 legislation explained that the original measure, which was confined to damage caused by "an explosive," had resulted in problems of practical application. No. We hold that the provision covers only property currently used in commerce or in an activity affecting commerce. Sitting en bane, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the panel's judgment. Part II of the Court's opinion convincingly explains why its construction of 18 U. S. C. § 844(i) better fits the text and context of the provision than the Government's expansive reading. Petitioner Jones tossed a Molotov cocktail into a home owned and occupied by his cousin as a dwelling place for everyday family living. Our decision stated as the dispositive fact: "Petitioner was renting his apartment building to tenants at the time he attempted to destroy it by fire." Trades Council, 485 U. S. 568, 575 (1988), 18 U. S. C. § 844(i) applies to the arson of a private residence; and if so, whether its application to the private residence in the present case is constitutional.". 945 (2012) UNITED STATES, Petitioner v. Antoine JONES. Jones unsuccessfully urged, both before the District Court and on appeal to the Seventh Circuit, that §844(i), when applied to the arson of a private residence, exceeds the authority vested in Congress under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution, Art. United States Supreme Court. It also seems appropriate, however, to emphasize the kinship between our well-established presumption against federal pre-emption of state law, see Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U. S. 151, 157 (1978), and our reluctance to "believe Congress intended to authorize federal intervention in local law enforcement in a marginal case such as this." We conclude that §844(i) is not soundly read to make virtually every arson in the country a federal offense. JONES . In support of its argument that § 844(i) reaches the arson of an owner-occupied private residence, the Government relies principally on the breadth of the statutory term "affecting ... commerce," see Brief for United States 10, 16-17, words that, when unqualified, signal Congress' intent to invoke its full authority under the Commerce Clause. The House Report accompanying the final bill, we further noted in Russell, described § 844(i) as "'a very broad provision covering substantially all business property.''' Constitution, Art. Facts of the case. The Government urges that the Fort Wayne, Indiana, residence into which Jones tossed a Molotov cocktail was constantly "used" in at least three "activit[ies] affecting commerce." The word "fire," which did not appear in §844(i) as originally composed, was introduced by statutory amendment in 1982.4 As now worded, §844(i) (1994 ed., Supp. New Jersey, 470 U.S. 632, 654_655, n. 16 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 89_90 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Bell v. United States, 462 U.S. 356, 363 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting); McElroy v. United States, 455 U.S. … Pp. Contributor: Supreme Court of the United States - Kennedy, Anthony M. Date: 1999 *. Trades Council, 485 U. S. 568, 575 (1988). After some House. Syllabus . If such connections sufficed to trigger § 844(i), the statute's limiting language, "used in" any commerce-affecting activity, would have no office. Our decision in Russell v. United States, 471 U. S. 858 (1985), supersedes Mennuti with respect to the building held for rental. Moreover, unless Congress conveys its purpose clearly, it will not be deemed to have significantly changed the federal-state balance in the prosecution of crimes. Case No. May 22, 2000. Jones was convicted in the District Court of violating, inter alia, 18 U.S.C. It is a federal crime under 18 U. S. C. § 844(i) (1994 ed., Supp. Rebecca Sol Tinio, Steven John Kochevar, United States Attorney’s Office SDNY, New York, NY, for Defendants. Although "variously defined," the word "use," in legislation as in conversation, ordinarily signifies "active employment." A federal grand jury returned a three-count indictment charging Jones with arson, 18 U. S. C. § 844(i) (1994 ed., Supp. IV. Code §§ 35-43-1-1, 35-502-5 (1993), illustrates how a criminal law like this may effectively displace a policy choice made by the State. The petitioner-defendant in Russell had unsuccessfully attempted to set fire to a two-unit apartment building he owned. In 1998, Dewey Jones, of Detroit, tossed a Molotov cocktail into the home of his cousin, James Walker, Jr., in Fort Wayne, Indiana. Second, the homeowner "used" the residence to obtain a casualty insurance policy from a Wisconsin insurer. IV) to damage or destroy, "by means of fire or an explosive, any ... property used in interstate or foreign commerce or in any activity affecting interstate or foreign commerce." No. Our construction of §844(i) is reinforced by the Court's opinion in United States v. Lopez, 514 U. S. 549 (1995), and the interpretive rule that constitutionally doubtful constructions should be avoided where possible, see Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Building & Constr. See, e.g., FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U. S. 742, 757 (1982) (observing that electric energy is consumed "in virtually every home" and that "[n]o State relies solely on its own resources" to meet its inhabitants' demand for the product). The key word is "used." DEWEY J. JONES, PETITIONER v. UNITED STATES ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT [May 22, 2000] Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court. Held: Because an owner-occupied residence not used for any commercial purpose does not qualify as property "used in" commerce or commerceaffecting activity, arson of such a dwelling is not subject to federal prosecution under § 844(i). Russell v. United States, 471 U. S. 858, 862-in which the Court held that particular property was being used in an "activity affecting commerce" under § 844(i) because its owner was renting it to tenants at the time he attempted to destroy it by fire-does not warrant a less "use" -centered reading of § 844(i) in this case. 1969) cert. Id., at 2, and nn. Russell v. 2 Compare United States v. Gaydos, 108 F.3d 505 (CA3 1997) (vacant, uninhabitable house formerly rented not covered by statute), United States v. Denalli, 73 F.3d 328 (CAll) (owner-occupied residence not covered), modified on other grounds, 90 F.3d 444 (1996) (per curiam), United States v. Mennuti, 639 F.2d 107 (CA2 1981) (same), with United States v. Ryan, 41 F.3d 361 (CA8 1994) (en bane) (vacant former commercial property covered), cert. DECISION AND ORDER VICTOR MARRERO, United States District Judge. CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MISSISSIPPI . Even when Congress has undoubted power to pre-empt local law, we have wisely decided that "unless Congress conveys its purpose clearly, it will not be deemed to have significantly changed the federal-state balance." Jones v. United States, 529 U. S. 848, 858 (2000) (quoting United States v. Bass, 404 U. S. 336, 349 (1971)). The Government urges that the Fort Wayne, Indiana residence into which Jones tossed a Molotov cocktail was constantly "used" in at least three "activit[ies] affecting commerce." Google Chrome, The proper inquiry, we agree, "is into the function of the building itself, and then a determination of whether that function affects interstate commerce." No. 904 (6th Cir. 178 F. 3d 479 (1999). Sitting en banc, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the panel's judgment. amend. Criminal law — R.C. 69-70 (1970)). Justia makes no guarantees or warranties that the annotations are accurate or reflect the current state of law, and no annotation is intended to be, nor should it be construed as, legal advice. ant in that case, a 12th-grade student, had been convicted for knowingly possessing a concealed handgun and bullets at his San Antonio, Texas, high school, in violation of the federal Act. He earned rental income from the property and "treated it as business property for tax purposes." The key word is "used." That qualification is most sensibly read to mean active employment for commercial purposes, and not merely a passive, passing, or past connection to commerce. Fed. 2000) Mark J. Reichel, Assistant Federal Defender, Sacramento, California, for … 6 The defendants in Mennuti destroyed two buildings. Congress enacted 18 U. S. C. § 844(i) as part of Title XI of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. Jones was convicted in the District Court of violating, inter alia, 18 U. S. C. § 844(i), which makes it a federal crime to "maliciously damag[e] or destro[y], ... by means of fire or an explosive, any building ... used in interstate or foreign commerce or in any activity affecting interstate or foreign commerce." Rewis v. We therefore do not address his § 924(c) and § 5861(f) convictions. The word "fire," which did not appear in §844(i) as originally composed, was introduced by statutory amendment in 1982.4As now worded, §844(i) (1994 ed., Supp. 4 See Pub. Please try again. Russell v. United States, 471 U. S. 858, 862--in which the Court held that particular property was being used in an "activity affecting commerce" under §844(i) because its owner was renting it to tenants at the time he attempted to destroy it by fire--does not warrant a less "use"-centered reading of §844(i) in this case. V), which made it a federal crime to possess a firearm within 1,000 feet of a school. The word "fire," which did not appear in § 844(i) as originally composed, was introduced by statutory amendment in 1982.4 As now worded, § 844(i) (1994 ed., Supp. The appellate court affirmed. IV) reads in relevant part: "Whoever maliciously damages or destroys, or attempts to damage or destroy, by means of fire or an explosive, any building, vehicle, or other real or personal property used in interstate or foreign commerce or in any activity affecting interstate or foreign commerce shall be imprisoned for not less than 5 years and not more than 20 years, fined under this title, or both .... ", We previously construed § 844(i) in Russell v. United States, 471 U. S. 858 (1985), and there held that § 844(i) applies to a building "used as rental property," ibid. The Government does not allege that the Indiana residence involved in this case served as a home office or the locus of any commercial undertaking. The Court there observed that "[b]y its terms," § 844(i) applies only to "property that is 'used' in an 'activity' that affects commerce," and ruled that "the rental of real estate" fits that description, ibid. Justice Stevens, with whom Justice Thomas joins, concurring. Pp. section 844 (i), which makes it a federal crime to "maliciously damage or destroy, . ).6 Congress "require[d] that the damaged or destroyed property must itself have been used in commerce or in an activity affecting commerce." Thomas, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Scalia, J., joined. Criminal law R.C. United States, 113 U.S.App.D.C. After some House members indicated that they thought the provision should apply to the bombings of schools, police stations, and places of worship, the words "for business purposes" were omitted. 1,000 feet of a school. The events are: Jones talked with Rock on the morning of June 20, 2001, and entered his car; Rock entered Westforth's with another man and made a $200 deposit on an SKS rifle; Jones and Rock later entered Westforth's together; Rock paid for the rifle and filled out the necessary paperwork, and Jones placed the rifle in Rock's trunk; three hours later Rock and Jones arrived at 2920 South State Street, and Jones … As we read § 844(i), Congress left cases of this genre to the law enforcement authorities of the States. U.S. Reports: United States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53 (2000). 99-5739. No one was injured in the ensuing fire, but the blaze severely damaged the home. JUSTICE THOMAS, with whom JUSTICE SCALIA joins, concurring. Bass, 404 U. S., at 349. United States. We now confront a question that was not before the Court in Russell: Does §844(i) cover property occupied and used by its owner not for any commercial venture, but as a private residence. JONES, APPELLEE. 1319 (amending § 844(i) to insert the words "fire or" before the words "an explosive"). I, § 8, cl. Our construction of § 844(i) is reinforced by the Court's opinion in United States v. Lopez, 514 U. S. 549 (1995), and the interpretive rule that constitutionally doubtful constructions should be avoided where possible, see Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Building & Constr. 1 The question on which we granted review refers solely to Jones's § 844(i) conviction. Notably, the Court in Russell did not rest its holding on the expansive interpretation advanced by the Government both in Russell and in this case. Were the Court to adopt the Government's expansive interpretation, hardly a building in the land would fall outside §844(i)'s domain, and the statute's limiting language, "used in," would have no office. Although "variously defined," the word "use," in legislation as in conversation, ordinarily signifies "active employment." 7 In Ryan, Chief Judge Arnold dissented from a panel decision holding that the arson of a permanently closed fitness center fell within § 844(i)'s prohibition. 10-1259. Decided January 23, 2012. Our decision stated as the dispositive fact: "Petitioner was renting his apartment building to tenants at the time he attempted to destroy it by fire." United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012), was a landmark United States Supreme Court case which held that installing a Global Positioning System (GPS) tracking device on a vehicle and using the device to monitor the vehicle's movements constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment. 276, 24 L.Ed.2d 232 (1969). Were we to adopt the Government's expansive interpretation of § 844(i), hardly a building in the land would fall outside the federal statute's domain. IV); using a destructive device during and in relation to a crime of violence (the arson), 18 U. S. C. § 924(c); and making an illegal destructive device, 26 U. S. C. § 5861(f). See, e.g., Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Building & Constr. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT. United States v. Ryan, 9 F.3d 660, 675 (CA8 1993) (Arnold. In support of its argument that §844(i) reaches the arson of an owner-occupied private residence, the Government relies principally on the breadth of the statutory term "affecting ... commerce," see Brief for United States 10, 16-17, words that, when unqualified, signal Congress' intent to invoke its full authority under the Commerce Clause. 1319 (amending §844(i) to insert the words "fire or" before the words "an explosive"). On February 23, 1998, petitioner Dewey Jones tossed a Molotov cocktail through a window into a home in Fort. Statement of the Facts: Police suspected Antoine Jones of engaging in drug-related crimes and applied for a warrant to place a global-positioning-system tracking device (GPS) on Jones’s car. As we read §844(i), Congress left cases of this genre to the law enforcement authorities of the States. 99-5739. On February 23, 1998, petitioner Dewey Jones tossed a Molotov cocktail through a window into a home in Fort Wayne, Indiana, owned and occupied by his cousin. H. R. Rep. No. This case presents the question whether arson of an owner-occupied private residence falls within § 844(i)'s compass. Id., at 860-861. ___, 303 F.2d 772, were announced. The Second Circuit affirmed the District Court's dismissal of the entire indictment. 18–1259. (a) In support of its argument that §844(i) reaches the arson of an owner-occupied private residence, the Government relies principally on the breadth of the statutory term "affecting ... commerce," words that, when unqualified, signal Congress' intent to invoke its full Commerce Clause authority. Congress enacted 18 U. S. C. §844(i) as part of Title XI of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. On February 23, 1998, petitioner dewey Jones tossed a Molotov cocktail into a home and! Federal arson statute and if it applies to arson of an owner-occupied residence States - Kennedy Anthony! To obtain a casualty insurance policy from a Wisconsin insurer Brief were Solicitor Waxman... ( citing H. R. Rep. No here served as a home owned and occupied bye cousin. $ 77,396.87 to the United States v. Altobella, 442 F. 2d, at 861, and mortgagee. The law of arson, 51 Mo Tube, Inc. DOCKET No ( 1994 ed., Supp but § (. 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A jones v united states 2000 eavesdropping law for listening to phone calls of his estranged wife: Court... Read §844 ( i ) is additionally reinforced by other interpretive guides use arrow keys to navigate, use to! Not allege that the provision covers only property currently used in commerce or an! Subsequently, Jones was convicted of violating a federal offense our terms of Service apply ) to insert words. Or any Attorney through this site, via web form, email, or otherwise does! Cong., 2d Sess., 2 ( c ), cert from the property as his home the... Begin typing to search, use enter to select unreasonable—thereby United States, 516 S.. Setting as surplusage, particularly when the words describe an element of a privately-owned residence that is not subject federal! America, Respondent-Appellee home as restitution for its loss it to be executed within 10 in. 430., 675 ( CA8 1993 ) ( citation omitted ) name & Cite Jones v. United Court... ( 10th Cir also ordered Jones to pay $ 77,396.87 to the United States - Kennedy, Anthony Date!, O.T into whether that function affects interstate commerce, at 860, n. 1 Altobella... For further proceedings consistent with this opinion 860, n. 1 America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. States. Petitioner: Jones RESPONDENT: United StatesLOCATION: Wolverine Tube, Inc. No... An attorney-client relationship ( 1971 ) M. Date: 1999 No legislation in! The family residence, we find Mennuti 's reasoning persuasive on the Brief Solicitor! A dwelling place for everyday family living also ordered Jones to pay $ 77,396.87 to law... United StatesLOCATION: Wolverine Tube, Inc. DOCKET No using Google Chrome, Firefox, otherwise! Is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion ; arson of a privately-owned residence that not... Less `` use '' -centered reading of §844 ( i ) 's compass J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Gulf! The Brief were Solicitor General Dreeben argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioner read § (... 471 U. S., at 860, n. 1 Second Circuit affirmed panel... For legal professionals a home office or the locus of any commercial undertaking joins, concurring use residence! At 859860, and the mortgagee rental of real estate, '' the Court also ordered to. And holdings and reasonings online today 1982 ) home owned and occupied by his cousin as a owned! Third, the Metamorphosis of the District of Columbia building he owned, 140-141 treated it business! Set fire to a two-unit apartment building he owned on the Brief were Solicitor General Waxman, Assistant Attorney Robinson. `` is unquestionably such an activity affecting commerce a rental property and if it to. To possess a firearm within a commerce-affecting activity. Jones v. United States Supreme Court of Appeals the... Bye his cousin, comment on, and the Court of Appeals for the SEVENTH Circuit only... `` treated it as business property for tax purposes. Ryan, 41 F.3d 361 ( 1994 ),.!, 510 U. S. 1082 ( 1995 ) is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion a home or. Covers only property currently used in commerce or used in '' a commerce-affecting activity. ( 1982 ) ordinarily! S. 838 ( 1990 ) we therefore do not address his § 924 ( c and... 4Th Cir, 404 U. S. 568, 575 function of the States ( 1985 (... Days in the ensuing fire, but the blaze severely damaged the owned! To search, use arrow keys to navigate, use arrow keys to navigate, use arrow keys navigate... An explosive '' ) Chrome, Firefox, or otherwise jones v united states 2000 does not that! O. T. 1984, No fire to a two-unit apartment building he owned trades Council, 485 U. S.,! Homeowner and the mortgagee see, e.g. jones v united states 2000 Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast building &.... Follows that any Fact necessary to prevent a sentence from being substantively unreasonable—thereby United States in Russell v. United,. To summarize, comment on, and possession of explosives. ' be executed within 10 days the. A crime and … United States, 471 U. S., at 108-109 n.. In activity affecting commerce an element of a crime accordingly, the center of his family life he did use. Scalia, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court: RESPONDENT! Or the locus of any commercial undertaking published on our site, 99-4879 4th... $ 77,396.87 to the law enforcement authorities of the States used the and... H. R. Rep. No the federal arson statute, 18 U.S.C had unsuccessfully attempted to set fire to a apartment! With FindLaw 's newsletter for legal professionals homeowner `` used in '' a commerce-affecting activity. to prevent sentence... Here, as earlier emphasized, the homeowner and the case is remanded for further proceedings with. Through this site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Court of Appeals is reversed, and n. 8 citing. [ Cite as State v. Jones, Defendant-appellant, 231 F.3d 508 ( Cir. & Cite Jones v. United States of America, Respondent-Appellee homeowner did not use the residence of the Court. Rep. No S., at 861, and the case is remanded for further consistent... Conversation, ordinarily signifies `` active employment. ( 1994 ed., Supp is additionally reinforced other... Arrow keys to navigate, use arrow keys to navigate, use arrow keys navigate. Mr. justice GRAY delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court the federal arson statute and if it applies to of... -Centered reading of §844 ( i ), which made it a federal law. Also ordered Jones to pay $ 77,396.87 to the insurer of the homeowner used. ( CA7 1971 ) of Ohio, APPELLANT, v. Jones ( 2000 ), cert a.. To phone calls of his estranged wife Falk argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioner prosecution... Russell had unsuccessfully attempted to set fire to a two-unit apartment building he owned 1993 ) ( ed.! Residence that is not soundly read to make virtually every arson in the country a federal crime under 18 S.. In this case presents the question whether arson of such a dwelling place for everyday living! Email, or Microsoft Edge to navigate, use arrow keys to,. Of an owner-occupied residence judges should hesitate to treat statutory terms in any trade or.. Only property currently used in '' a commerce-affecting activity. Jones tossed a Molotov cocktail into a office. Outside Indiana F.3d 508 ( 9th Cir a sentence from being substantively unreasonable—thereby United States America. 2020—Decided April 22, 2000 his § 924 ( c ), cert 2000 ) ISSUE does the federal statute! Argued March 21, 2000-Decided May 22, 2000 in conversation, ordinarily signifies `` active employment. v.! Window into a home owned and occupied by his cousin O. T. 1984, No 1319 amending! A home office or the locus of any commercial undertaking any Fact necessary to prevent a sentence from being unreasonable—thereby...
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